Maltese law does not lay down a procedure for revoking a presidential pardon.

Maltese law clearly recognises the power to grant a pardon. What it does not do, in Article 93 itself, is provide a detailed statutory sequence for what must happen when somebody is alleged to have breached a condition and the State considers taking the pardon back.

What Article 93 actually says

Article 93(1)(a) of the Constitution of Malta gives the President power to grant a pardon, either freely or subject to lawful conditions. The same article also deals with respites, substitution of punishment and remission of punishment.

What Article 93 does not contain is a separate provision setting out a revocation process: it does not specify a statutory hearing, a burden of proof for establishing breach, a particular decision-maker for determining disputed facts, a timetable, or a sequence of notices and appeals specifically for withdrawing a pardon.

That distinction is important. The Constitution supplies the legal basis for a conditional pardon, but the text of Article 93 should not be presented as though it contains a complete revocation code.

Why the conditions in the individual pardon matter

Because Article 93 allows a pardon to be made subject to lawful conditions, the wording of the particular proclamation becomes central. A condition may define what the beneficiary must do and may state what consequence follows from non-compliance.

George Farrugia's 2013 pardon illustrates this. Contemporary reporting said that if he failed to tell the whole truth or transfer relevant criminal proceeds, the pardon would be automatically annulled. That wording describes a consequence attached to the pardon itself. It still does not, by itself, answer every procedural question that could arise if the alleged breach were disputed.

Melvin Theuma's 2019 pardon is also expressly conditional. Reporting on the pardon states that he was required to testify in proceedings linked to the murder whenever requested. Refusal or failure to testify was to result in the pardon being withdrawn or treated as though it had never been granted. During the 2026 Fenech trial, the jury was also taken through the pardon itself and reminded that Theuma remained bound by its truthfulness conditions.

Theuma's case shows the procedure followed in practice

The 2023 dispute over Melvin Theuma's pardon gives a concrete example of how a request for withdrawal was handled. Yorgen Fenech asked for the pardon to be withdrawn. The official government statement records that Cabinet considered the request together with advice from the Attorney General and Commissioner of Police, and decided to advise the President not to accept it.

The sequence therefore included an allegation or request, legal and police advice, Cabinet consideration and advice to the President. That is strong evidence of the constitutional practice followed in that case. It should not, however, be misdescribed as a detailed procedure expressly written into Article 93.

The unresolved question: who determines a disputed breach?

The absence of a detailed statutory procedure becomes most important when the alleged breach is contested. During the George Farrugia controversy in 2015, lawyers publicly raised the question of who would decide whether the conditions had actually been broken: the police, Cabinet or the President. Kevin Aquilina's view, as reported at the time, was that withdrawal would ultimately involve the President acting on Cabinet advice after advice from the Attorney General and police.

The same commentary also contemplated a court challenge to the reasons for withdrawal. But because an actual Maltese revocation precedent was not identified, there is limited appellate jurisprudence demonstrating exactly how a contested withdrawal would operate in practice.

Evaluation

The claim that 'Maltese law contains no mechanism at all for withdrawing a conditional pardon' would go too far. Conditional pardons are constitutionally recognised, individual pardons can contain consequences for breach, and Maltese practice shows a process through Cabinet and the President.

But the opposite claim, that the Constitution lays down a clear, detailed statutory revocation procedure, is also inaccurate. Article 93 grants the pardoning power and allows lawful conditions; it does not prescribe a comprehensive step-by-step procedure for establishing breach and revoking the pardon.

For a case such as Melvin Theuma's, the legally important questions therefore include the exact wording of the proclamation, whether a condition was in fact breached, the constitutional decision-making process and, if challenged, what a court would say about that process.